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PRIVACY ON THE INTERNET: 
AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS1
Jeevan Jaisingh, Jack Barron, Alok Chaturvedi, and Shailendra Mehta





This paper seeks to address the sharp increase in public debate about privacy issues, particularly on the issues
of Internet privacy and the value of personal information. The research questions we are addressing here are
 How should an Internet Service Provider (ISP) price its service given that the consumers vary in their
valuation for privacy and also vary in terms of the value of their personal information to a third party?  Should
the ISP have a blanket policy of never collecting, or a policy of always collecting and revealing information?
We calculate the separating and pooling strategies for the ISP under asymmetric information and compare
them with the full information benchmarks.  We find that in some cases the ISP may be no worse off than in the
full information case while in other cases it may have to restrict the set of contracts so that they are incentive
compatible and individually rational.
Introduction
The technological developments that have made e-commerce possible have also enhanced the ability of companies to collect,
store, transfer, and analyze vast amounts of data, from and about the consumers who visit their store on the World Wide Web
(FTC 2000).  These developments have increased privacy concerns among consumers, especially online consumers.  According
to a recent Business Week/Harris poll (Business Week 1998), privacy is the number one consumer issue facing the Internet.  These
concerns about privacy need to be addressed to enable the growth of E-commerce.
Te other side of the story is that personal information is a valuable asset to private and governmental institutions, which use it
to reduce their costs of operation (Laudon 1996).  The increasing thirst for personal information, and innovations in targeting
technique have made targeted marketing the hottest form of marketing, growing at twice the rate of Americas GNP.  In 1995,
direct marketing resulted in $600 billion in sales (Solove 2000).
It is evident that a proper balance needs to be achieved between the consumers concerns for privacy and the needs of firms for
personal information.  This paper seeks to address the sharp increase in public debate about privacy issues, particularly on the
issues of Internet privacy and the value of personal information.  Past research (Laudon 1996, Kang 1998, Sovern 1999) has
suggested an information market-based solution where consumers reveal potentially useful personal information in return for
money and personalized services.  However to the best of our knowledge, there has not been much research addressing the
economic analysis of transactions privacy and information markets.  It is the intention of this research to fill that void.  
In this paper the problem that we model is that of an Internet Service Provider (ISP).  It is technically feasible for the ISP to track
the browsing habits of its consumers.  If allowed to collect data on browsing habits, the ISP can potentially build up a profile of
the consumer, which may include but is not limited to information about preferences, income segment etc.  This information may
be of great use to a third party who wants to target the consumers with a personalized product or service.  By providing the third
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party access to this information, the ISP enables the matching of the third party with the right consumers.  This collection and
release of consumer information if done without the permission of the consumer is what is termed as privacy violation in our
context. However the release of information to a third party if done with the consent of the consumer could lead to overall increase
in social welfare.
The research questions we are addressing here are  How should the ISP price its service given that the consumers vary in their
valuation for privacy and also vary in terms of the value of their personal information to the third party?  Should the ISP have a
blanket policy of never collecting, or a policy of always collecting and revealing information?  Is it better off providing its
customers with a choice of several pricing options each varying in the amount of information collected and revealed?  Which of
these options is Pareto Optimal?
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 covers the background literature on privacy.  We specify our assumptions
and the model framework in section 3.  Section 4 summarizes the results and the managerial implications.  In Section 5 we look
at the limitations of our results and possible extensions.
Background
Privacy is defined as the moral claim of the individuals to be left alone and to control the flow of information about themselves
(Coase 1960; Westin 1967).  Coasian logic suggests that given sufficient flexibility in contracting, stringent privacy laws are
unnecessary to achieve efficiency in concealment or revelation of information (Kahn et al 2000).  For a background on the
evolution of privacy concerns see Culnan (1993).  More recently Wang et al (1998) have provided a taxonomy of consumer
privacy concerns specific to the Internet marketing area.
Past research on privacy can be classified into three different streams  Legal, Information Systems and Economic.  Sovern (1999)
addresses the issue of opting in or opting out of databases and mailing lists.  The article argues that businesses have both the
incentive and the ability to increase consumers transaction costs in protecting privacy.  Faced with this and other constraints,
many consumers decide ultimately not to protect their privacy.  The paper  proposes several ways by which consumers
transaction costs can be reduced or eliminated.  Kang (1998) is more relevant to our research question since it focuses on the
problem of personal data generated in cyberspace transactions.  Kang proposes solving the problem by treating personal
information as a commodity that interested parties should contract for in the course of negotiating a cyberspace transaction.
Literature in the Information Systems stream has concentrated on the technical aspects of privacy.  The World-Wide Web
Consortium (W3C)s Platform for Privacy Preference Project (P3P) provides a framework for informed online interactions.  P3P
applications will allow users to be informed about Web Site practices, delegate decisions to their computer agent when they wish,
and tailor relationships with specific sites (Reagle and Cranor 1999).  Tools available for privacy protection include Crowds
(Reiter and Rubin 1997), Onion Routing (Goldschlag et al 1999), Anonymizer (www.anonymizer.com), and anonymous re-
mailers (Bacard 1996).  Laudon (1996) proposes a framework for an Information Market where consumer profiles would
aggregated and sold as commodities.  Consumers would be compensated for the loss of privacy by money or personalized
services.
Economic studies of Privacy include Hirshleifer (1980), Stigler (1980) and Posner (1981).  Most of these were written at a time
when technology was in its infancy  Internet was not even in existence.  More recently Kahn et al (2000) have looked at
efficiency gains under different privacy regimes.  Their environment is characterized with complete information and they look
at the social planners problem of when and when not transactional information should be made public knowledge.
Model
There are three sets of agents in the market - the consumers (A), the ISP (B) and the third parties (C).  There are a large number
of consumers and third parties but just a single ISP (firm).  Some of the consumers can be potential customers of a third party C.
However without prior information about consumer As buying profile, it is prohibitively expensive for a third party C to target
Jaisingh et al./Privacy on the Internet
2An example of targeting could be sending a sample product.  If the third party has no information about the consumers interests then sending
samples to the entire set of consumers would be very expensive.
3Risk Neutrality means that the agents utility function is linear in wealth.
4Reservation utility is the utility  that the agent gets by not subscribing to the ISP.
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a consumer A.2  If A allows B to collect information on her browsing behavior and subsequently release that information to C, then
C can identify if A can be a potential customer or not.  The consumers differ in their valuation for privacy and also in their value
to a third party based on their interests.  Let Consumer type be a vector .  " represents the valuation for privacy (L-),( βαθ =
Low, H-High).  $ represents whether the buyer information is useful to the third party and affiliates of the ISP (H- High Value,
L-Low Value).  All consumers are assumed to have the same valuation for the Internet service provided by B.  Thus there are four
consumer types: .  All agents are risk-neutral3 and the reservation utility4),();,();,();,( 4321 LLHLHHLH ==== θθθθ
of all consumers is assumed to be zero.  The firm B is a profit-maximizing monopolist.  We consider a two period model similar
to Kahn et al (2000).  In the first period the consumer A chooses to subscribe to the Internet Service provided by B.  Based on the
option chosen by A (to allow B to collect information or not), B collects information on the browsing behavior of A and then
releases the information to a third party C.  Now C knows As type perfectly and targets her with a personalized service or product.
As a result of this targeting, the utility of agents A, B and C change.  Since B enables the matching between A and C, B can extract
a rent from C.
Notation: v is the reservation utility of all consumers for Internet Service provided by B.  pj is the price charged for the service
for consumer type .  vi is the utility of agent i ( ) due to agent A subscribing to the service provided4,3,2,1, =jjθ CBAi ,,=
by B.  wi is the change in utility of agent i ( ) due to release of information and subsequent match between A and C.CBAi ,,=
V,P and c are the reservation utility, price and marginal cost respectively of the personalized service provided by the third party
C.  Assume that  i.e. all consumers would want to buy the personalized service at the price P.  cH and cL are the disutilityPV >
due to loss of privacy for consumers who have a high and low valuation for privacy respectively .  is the rent that)( LH cc > Ip
B extracts from C for the information collected on A.  8j is B and Cs  prior that the consumer is of type 2j.
As is clear from our setting, our environment is characterized by asymmetric information.  Both B and C dont know As type in
period 1 while A knows his type.  In period 2 if A allows B to collect information, then B gets to know As type.  B charges a rent
from C for the right to know As type.  Before we analyze this setting we look at two benchmark cases  public information and
full information.  We describe these environments in the following sections (3.1 and 3.2) and then compare the results with the
asymmetric information case in section 3.3.
Public Information
As before A knows her type.  Also B knows As type in period 1 (hypothetically).  Information is always collected and is always
revealed to C.  Thus C always gets to know As type in period 2.
Table 1.  Profits/Surplus for Agents Under Public Information
Cons.
Type vA vB vC wA wB wC BA=
 vA+wA BB= vB+ wB BC= vC+wC
(H,L) v-p1 p1 0 -cH 0 0 v-p1-cH p1 0
(H,H) v-p2 p2 0 -cH+(V-P) 0 P-c v-p2-cH+(V-P) p2 P-c
(L,H) v-p3 p3 0 -cL+(V-P) 0 P-c v-p3-cL+(V-P) p3 P-c
(L,L) v-p4 p4 0 -cL 0 0 v-p4-cL p4 0
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The monopolist firm will extract the entire consumer surplus.  Hence the schedule of prices would be
.  Prices charged will have the followingLLHH cvpPVcvpPVcvpcvp −=−+−=−+−=−= 4321 );();(;
relationship .14122343 ;;; pppppppp >>>>
Full Information
B knows As type in period 1 (hypothetically) and can commit not to reveal the information to C in period.  A can choose whether
to allow B to reveal information to C or not. Let k be As choice variable.  k = 1corresponds to release of information to C and
k = 0 corresponds to no release of information.  B sets two sets of prices depending on As type and her choice.
Table 2.  Profits/surplus of Agents Under Full Information if A Chooses k = 1
Cons.
Type vA vB vC wA wB wC BA=




(H,L) v-p1 p1 0 Hc− 0 0 Hcpv −− 1 p1 0
(H,H) v-p2 p2 0 -cH+(V-P) pI P-c-pI )(2 PVcpv H −+−− p2+pI P-c-pI
(L,H) v-p3 p3 0 -cL+(V-P) pI P-c-pI )(3 PVcpv L −+−− p3+pI P-c-pI
(L,L) v-p4 p4 0 Lc− 0 0 Lcpv −− 4 p4 0
Table 3.  Profits/Surplus of Agents Under Full Information if A chooses (k = 0)
Cons. Type vA vB vC wA wB wC BA=
 vA+wA BB= vB+ wB BC= vC+wC
21 =(H,L) v-p1 p1 0 0 0 0 1pv − p1 0
22 = (H,H) v-p2 p2 0 0 0 0 2pv − p2 0
23 = (L,H) v-p3 p3 0 0 0 0 3pv − p3 0
24 = (L,L) v-p4 p4 0 0 0 0 4pv − p4 0
Case 1: HL cPVc <−<
B will offer the service to A at a contract that specifies not just the price but also whether information will be collected and
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third contract information is collected and revealed to B based on As choice.








* =+−=== kcvpkvp L ε
In all cases ensures that the A will pick the option (*) that maximizes Bs profit0>ε
Case 2:  (see Appendix Section A.1)PVcc HL −<<
Case 3:  (see Appendix Section A.2)HL ccPV <<−
Asymmetric Information
B doesnt know As type.  A knows her valuation for privacy and also knows that her information is going to be useful to one of
the third parties or in other words the personalized service provided by one of the Cs will be useful to her.  B provides a set of
contracts  one where information wont be collected and one where information will be collected and potentially revealed.  Let
pP be the price of the first contract (information is kept private) and pR be the price of the second contract (information is revealed).
A chooses from this set of contracts.  The contracts that could be offered by B are  or  or{ }0,( =kp p { }1, =kpR
.  The first two are pooling contracts.  The intuition for these types of contracts could be that the firms{ }1,();0,( == kpkp RP
have a blanket policy regarding collection of information and release: they could either follow a policy of never collecting
information or they could have policy of always collecting and releasing information.5  If , then the surplus and profits)0( =k
of agents are as follows:
Table 4.  Profits/Surplus if All Agents Choose the Contract }0,{ =kpP
Cons. 
Type vA vB vC wA wB wC BA=
 vA+wA BB= vB+ wB BC= vC+wC
21 =(H,L) v-pP pP 0 0 0 0 Ppv − pP 0
22 = (H,H) v-pP pP 0 0 0 0 Ppv − pP 0
23 = (L,H) v-pP pP 0 0 0 0 Ppv − pP 0
24 = (L,L) v-pP pP 0 0 0 0 Ppv − pP 0
If , then the surplus and profits of agents are as follows:)1( =k
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Table 5.  Profits/Surplus if All Agents Choose the Contract }1,{ =kpR
Cons. Type vA vB vC wA wB wC BA=




21 =(H,L) v-pR pR 0 Hc− 0 0 HR cpv −− pR 0
22 = (H,H) v-pR pR 0 -cH+(V-P) pI P-c-pI )( PVcpv HR −+−− pR+pI P-c-pI
23 = (L,H) v-pR pR 0 -cL+(V-P) pI P-c-pI )( PVcpv LR −+−− pR+pI P-c-pI
24 = (L,L) v-pR pR 0 Lc− 0 0 LR cpv −− pR 0
Pooling-Non-Revealing:  If B has a policy of never collecting and releasing information - .  B will charge a price{ }0, =kpP
.  B will extract the entire consumer surplus of all types.vp p =
Pooling- Revealing:  If B has a policy of always collecting and releasing information - .  B has a number of pricing{ }1, =kpR
options here.  Consider the case . Also assume that . Thus we haveHL cPVc <−< PVcvcv HL −+−<−
.  In the price range  all consumer types subscribe to thePVcvPVcvcvcv LHLH −+−<−+−<−<− [ ]Hcv −,0
service.  However the firm would leave the least on the table if it charged the price .  In the price rangeHR cvp −=
 B can sell to all consumer types except type 21.  The firm is better off picking the price  than any( ]LH cvcv −− , LR cvp −=
other price in this range.  In the price range  B sells to types 22 and 23 and is better off charging the( ]PVcvcv HL −+−− ,
price .  Similarly in the price range  B only sells to types 23 andPVcvp HR −+−= ( ]PVcvPVcv LH −+−−+− ,
is better off charging the price .  B cannot charge a price greater than  since noPVcvp HR −+−= PVcv H −+−
consumer type would buy the service at that price.
Table 6.  Surplus of Under the Different Pooling-Revealing Prices
HR cvp −= LR cvp −= PVcvp HR −+−= PVcvp LR −+−=
21 =(H,L) 0 0)( LH cc −− 0)( PV −− 0)()( PVcc LH −−−−






0 0)( LH cc −−
23 = (L,H) PVcc LH −+− PV − LH cc − 0








aSince Consumer surplus is negative no trade takes place at this price.
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Table 7.  Firm Profits Under the Different Pooling-Revealing Prices
Prices Firms (B) surplus/profits
HR cvp −= [ ]))(())(( 324321 cPcvN H −++−+++ λλλλλλ
LR cvp −= [ ]))(())(( 32432 cPcvN L −++−++ λλλλλ
PVcvp HR −+−= [ ]))(())(( 3232 cPPVcvN H −++−+−+ λλλλ
PVcvp LR −+−= [ ])()( 33 cPPVcvN L −+−+− λλ
The optimal price pR* (i.e. price that maximizes profits when information is always revealed) would depend on the values of the
exogenous parameters and the firms prior on types. 
Case 1: 4321 ;0 λλλλ ===












































































Given conditions 1 and 4, B should have policy of never collecting and revealing information.  Given conditions 2 and 3, it is
optimal for the firm to always collect and reveal information to the third party.
Business Models for the Digital Economy
5Individual Rationality (IR) and Incentive Compatibility (IC) constraints.
6 Assuming θ3 always chooses option , the option where he gets personalized service and which is more profitable
)1,( =−+− kPVcv L
to B.
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Table 8.  Profits and Surpluses under Full and Asymmetric Information and under Different Strategies








)1,( =−= kcvp L PV − 0 )](2












1[ cPPVcvN L −+−+−
F u l l
Information
)1);(( *3* =−+−= kPVcvp L
)0,( *4* == kvp 0 0 )](2
1)2(
2




)1);(( *3* =−+−= kPVcvp L
)0,( *4* == kvp 0 0 )](2
1)2(
2
1[ cPPVcvN L −+−+−
The firm is thus always better off in the full information case.  In the Asymmetric information case, pooling strategy, type 23 will
be better off under one of the pricing policies ( ; i.e. where B has a policy of always collecting and revealing)1,( =−= kcvp L
information and charges a price of ).LR cvp −=
Separating Strategy:   Since there are only types  - low privacy valuation but differing021 == λλ ),();,( 43 LLHL == θθ
in value of information.  If ( are the pricing options for each type, then the prices should satisfy the)0,(),1,( 43 == kpkp
following constraints:
.5344343 ;;0;0 pvpvpvPVcpvpvPVcpv LL −≥−−≥−+−−≥−≥−+−−
The full information prices and , satisfies all the above constraints and so successfully separatesPVcvp L −+−=3 vp =4
type 23 and 24.  The IR constraints of both types and the incentive compatibility constraint of type 23 bind.  The reason the full
information prices can separate the two types is because none of the types has an incentive to lie: type 24 is not interested in the
personalized service type 23 gets and type 23 is no worse revealing that her information is going to be useful to at least one C.
It should be noted that that type 23 is indifferent between pricing options and 6.  B is thus)1,( =−+− kPVcv L )0,( =kv
better off adopting a separating strategy than adopting a pooling pricing strategy.  The interesting result here is that even with
asymmetric information, the firms may be no worse than in the full information case.
Case 2:  Analysis and results similar to Case 1.0; 4321 === λλλλ
Jaisingh et al./Privacy on the Internet
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Case 3:  see Appendix B.1.3241 ;0 λλλλ ===
When then no separating strategy exists.  For the full information prices)()( PVccP H −−>− )()( PVccP H −−≤−
separate the two types, thus in this case B is no worse than under full information.
Case 4: 0; 3241 === λλλλ





Outline of the results are given, details and pooling strategy prices are left to the interested reader.
Separating Strategy:  If ( are the separating pricing options, then firm B wants the consumer types 21,)1,(),0,( == kpkp RP











The full information prices satisfy these constraints for .  However for ,)()( PVccP H −−≤− )()( PVccP H −−>−
as in Case 3 there are no prices that separate the types.
It is clear from the above analysis that full information prices are able to separate the consumer types in some of the cases.
However with certain parameters, e.g. , the full information prices cannot)();&.( PVccPcPVc HHL −−>−<−<
separate types 22 and 23.  Note that with these parameters under full information they should be charged prices
and respectively.  However type 23 will have an incentive to lie and say that)1,( =−+− kPVcv H )1,( =−+− kPVcv L
she has a high valuation for privacy and hence be charged a lower price.  Another example is where .  ThePVcc HL −<<
full information prices cannot separate types 22 and 23 since as before the type 23 has an incentive to lie about her type.  In order
to find a separating mechanism to handle these cases, we modify our setting.  We consider the case  withPVcc HL −<<
.  We assumed in our setting before that the information on customer would be released to only one
2
1;0 3241 ==== λλλλ
third party C as a result of which each consumer A gets a utility .  We now relax this assumption  B can now releasewPV =−
information (with permission from A) to more than one third party.  In the base model setting, privacy was a binary variable 
either information was released or not released.  In the modified setting, there are varying degrees of privacy depending on the
number of third parties to whom information is revealed.  Thus if there are M third parties, then privacy could taken on any integer
values in [0,M].  Releasing information to M third parties corresponds to zero valuation for privacy and 0 corresponds to the
highest valuation for privacy.  Any value in between specifies an intermediate valuation for privacy.  The consumers utility from
personalized service is due to revealing information to n different Cs is given by nw.7  cH and cL continue to be the marginal cost
of privacy of types and  respectively.  The marginal cost of releasing information is more for high privacyHθθ ≡2 Lθθ ≡3
consumer 2H than for type 2L ( ).  Let  and  be the price charged by B for the service provided.  The utilityLH cc > Hp Lp
function of each type due to revealing information to n different third parties is given by
.  and  can be interpreted as theLLLHHHHH pcwnvpcwnvpncwnv −−+−−+=−−+ )(;)( Hcw − Lcw −
marginal benefit to revealing information for the high and low types - .  The firm B in order toHHLL wcwcww '' ≡−>−≡
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screen the consumer types offers two contracts .  The first contract is for type 2H and the second contract),();,( LLHH pnpn
for type 2L.
Figure 1. Indifference Curves and Contracts under Full and Asymmetric Information wcc HL <<
The vertical axis is the price charged and the horizontal axis is the number of third parties to whom the information is revealed.
The slopes of the indifference curves are and respectively for the high and low types- .  The firms underHw' Lw' HL ww '' >
full information would charge prices along the indifference curves - lines  and 0';0' =−+=−+ LLLHHH pwnvpwnv VH VL
respectively.  These indifference curves both pass through the point (0,v), which corresponds to highest level of privacy.  The firm
is best off if it offers the contracts at L and H for the low and high type consumers respectively which corresponds to the release
of information to M third parties.  Both consumer types are better off in the direction of the arrow-lower prices and more net
benefits from personalized services.  Under asymmetric information however the low privacy type has an incentive to lie.  So










The only contracts that achieve separation are ones where the individual rationality constraint of the high privacy type and the
incentive compatibility constraint of the low privacy type bind.  The firm B provides the low privacy type a subsidy.  The low
privacy type is thus better off in the asymmetric information case and enjoys a positive surplus.  The new indifference curve is
the line . There is a set of contracts available to the low privacy type while there is only one contract for the high privacy'' LV
type.  The contract for the high type is at the point of intersection  of the new indifference curve of the low type  and'H '' LV
the indifference curve of the high type.  All the feasible contracts for the low type lie on the segment . The firm B is best'' LH
off if the low types choose .  Thus under asymmetric information the firm is best off offering contracts and compared'L 'L 'H
with the full information contracts and .  If the subsidy to the low type is increased then the firm can extract rent from moreL H
third parties for the information of the high type consumer.  However the tradeoff is that is loses out on some part of the surplus
it gets from the low type consumer.  The Figs. for  and  are shown in the appendix sectionHL cPVc <−< HL ccPV <<−
C.
Jaisingh et al./Privacy on the Internet
8There is some evidence however which provides partial support for our findings  grocery stores have a differential pricing of goods based
on whether customers use grocery cards.  Use of the grocery cards provides discounts on goods purchased, with the implicit assumption that
the information collected by the grocery store can then be sold to third parties who then target the consumers with one to one marketing.  On
the Internet, the example of Free PC.com comes to mind  the company offered free PCs to consumer who would allow the company to
collect information.  Both the grocery store and Free PC are examples where the consumers were ready to put a price to their privacy in terms
of reduced prices or other products.
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Results and Implications
We have calculated the prices under asymmetric information only for the case .  The asymmetric informationHL cPVc <−<
prices for the other cases can be calculated on similar line and have been left out of paper for brevity.  For all cases, it is optimal
for the firm to have a separating strategy.  The full information prices successfully separate types except in cases where types 22
and 23 are present simultaneously and the rent that the firm can extract from the third party is less than the subsidy he has to give
the high privacy type to participate.  In the pooling-non-revealing strategy, the firm has much lower profits while in the pooling-
revealing strategy; the firm leaves something on the table for type 23.  We modify the setting later in order to successfully separate
types 22 and 23 by allowing the revelation of information to more than one third party.  By providing a subsidy to the low privacy
type consumer and by restricting the set of contracts that are available to the high privacy consumer, successful separation of types
can be achieved.  The firm can extract the entire surplus from the high-risk types but leaves some surplus for the low risk types.
If the subsidy to the low type is increased then the firm can extract rent from more third parties for the information of the high
type consumer.  However the tradeoff is that it loses out on some part of the surplus it gets from the low type consumer.
The results found here have important implications.  They suggest that an ISP or any firm that can collect information and form
consumer profiles for that matter is better off having a separating strategy for high privacy and low privacy types.  This is contrary
to some evidence that we see in practice  ISPs like AOL have a blanket policy of never collecting information and revealing
it to third parties.8  There is the other spectrum of firms too who do not have a privacy policy in place and presumably collect
information and reveal it to third parties.  Our theoretical results suggest that offering a set of polices designed for the different
types of consumers and allowing them to self-select is optimal.  We have shown here that in some cases the firm is no worse off
than in the full information case and can extract the entire consumer surplus.  However in cases where full information prices
cannot separate types, a slight modification in the setting allows the firm to separate types, however loosing out on some profits.
The results from our paper suggest that it is possible for firms to design more sophisticated mechanisms that allow the firms to
reap higher profits.
Limitations and Directions for Future Research
In this paper we consider a monopolist B who prices the service based on the different privacy valuations and value of information
to third parties.  It would have been more realistic to consider an oligopolistic setting or a competitive one and to compare the
results with those obtained here.  Solving the monopoly case is a first step before solving the other cases and is important from
a theoretical perspective.  The extension to a two firm case could be done by consider the problem to be game where each firm
decides whether to follow a separating strategy or a pooling strategy given the strategy of the other player.  Firm B here enabled
the matching between the consumers and the third parties and extracts a rent from the third party for the service provided.  Implicit
in the assumption is that B has perfect knowledge on the information requirements of the third parties.  We assumed risk neutrality
among all agents; there could be a qualitative change in the nature of the results if risk aversion is taken into account.  For the
mechanism designed here to be feasible, all agents should follow the actions specified by the contract.  It is possible that the firm
might release information to third parties even though the contract specifies otherwise.  To tackle such problems we propose that
Trusted Third Parties (TTP) should audit the firm practices with a severe penalty for non-conformance.  This should again take
care of the problem of secondary use of personal information that has not been addressed by the paper.
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Table A1.  Profits and Surpluses under Full and Asymmetric Information and Under Different Strategies
Optimal Pricing Option 22 = (H,H)
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Figure 2.  Indifference Curves and Contracts Under Full and Asymmetric Information HL cwc <<
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